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Abstract
This paper explores the effects of a tax levied on Spanish energy-related CO2 emissions. After
justifying the relevance of carbon taxation in the Spanish context, we consider the introduction of a
product (fossil-fuel) tax with a rate obtained through the ‘actual damage cost’ method. Our
empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we employ an input–output demand model to
calculate the price changes after the introduction of carbon taxation. In a second stage, simulation
with Spanish household micro-data for 1994 yields the environmental and economic effects of a
Spanish carbon tax. We find a limited short-run reaction to the carbon tax, which hampers its
environmental success. The carbon tax burden is, however, significant, with a proportional
distribution across households.
JEL classification: C33, C67, H31, Q28.
I. INTRODUCTION
The environmental and economic importance of climate change phenomena is
well established, as pointed out by growing scientific evidence and consensus.
Such climatic alterations are provoked by the increasing atmospheric
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concentrations of greenhouse gases, with anthropogenic CO2 production as the
main contributor. Accordingly, there is now a manifest need to control man-
made CO2 emissions in an effective and efficient manner, with carbon taxes
constituting a favoured alternative for economists.
In the context of growing and sizeable Spanish CO2 emissions, this paper
addresses the design of a hypothetical carbon tax levied on energy-related
emissions and estimates its effects on Spanish final consumption. Apart from the
theoretical advantages associated with environmental taxation, there are various
reasons to carry out this exercise. First of all, given the inefficiency of the
Spanish energy domain at the moment, there is an irrefutable need for a reliable
and cost-effective (market-based) climate change strategy in Spain. Moreover,
there are also grounds to expect a pre-eminent role for carbon taxes within the
emerging green tax reform model in the developed world (Álvarez, Gago and
Labandeira, 1998).
Following carbon tax design (tax-rate and tax-base setting), our empirical
analysis of the hypothetical tax proceeds in two stages. We first employ an
input–output demand model to calculate the price effects of the Spanish carbon
tax. With this information and the results from the estimation of a demand
system for the Spanish economy, micro-simulation yields consumers’ reaction to
the carbon tax and thus the environmental (in terms of behavioural responses),
distributional (in terms of tax payments and welfare measures) and revenue
outcomes.
Although a similar combination of input–output analysis and micro-
simulation of demand responses has already been used to assess the economic
and distributional effects of carbon taxation in a number of countries (for
example: Symons, Proops and Gay (1994) for the UK; Hamilton and Cameron
(1994) for Canada; Cornwell and Creedy (1996) for Australia), our exercise
delivers several contributions. To begin with, it is the first comprehensive
assessment of a Spanish carbon tax and allows for a wider international
comparison of results. Besides, unlike the preceding literature and also for the
first time in Spain, it uses the quadratic extension of the Almost Ideal Demand
Model of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) for simulation, thus providing a more
accurate representation of the behavioural responses to the carbon tax. Finally,
our hypothetical carbon tax rate is exogenous and rightly reflects the damage
associated with Spanish CO2 emissions, which contrasts with the (endogenous)
high rates needed to achieve the major and immediate CO2 reductions
contemplated in previous applications.
Regarding the main findings of this exercise, it is noteworthy that the
proposed Spanish carbon tax would raise considerable tax revenue. This is due
to the generalised dependence of developed economies upon CO2 emissions and
to the difficulties in modifying behaviours in the short run. As expected, the
carbon tax has limited environmental effectiveness. However, against intuition,
the hefty tax burden is not regressively distributed across households.Effects of Carbon Tax on Spanish Households
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The structure of the article is as follows. Section II first justifies the use of
carbon taxation in Spain, as a preamble to the proposed design and
implementation of a carbon tax. Section III deals with the input–output
framework to assess the impact of the hypothetical carbon tax upon the prices of
consumer goods. Section IV contains the microeconometric simulation to
analyse the effects of the environmental tax on total CO2 emissions, government
revenues and the distribution of tax burdens across households. Finally, the main
conclusions are presented in Section V.
II. SPANISH CO2 EMISSIONS AND THE USE OF CARBON TAXATION
1. The Need for Control
Despite the fact that Spain is not a major CO2 emitter and is currently subject to
rather lax international commitments,
1 there are powerful reasons to think that
environmental taxation may play a significant role in future Spanish climate
change policies. First of all, one can observe increasing internal pressures to
control the emission of greenhouse gases. In fact, Spain is extremely susceptible
to desert advance and water scarcity, and both are likely to worsen with climate
change phenomena.
The external pressures to control Spanish greenhouse gas emissions are also
significant and mounting, as noticed in the latest Conferences of the Parties of
the UNFCCC. The large rise of Spanish CO2 emissions in recent years, directly
linked to strong economic growth and to an inefficient energy system, makes
unjustifiable the preferential treatment enjoyed by Spain so far. Indeed, at the
moment of writing, Spain has almost consumed the (conceivable) Kyoto
permitted increase in greenhouse gas emissions for 2010.
2
Table 1 shows the main sources of Spanish CO2 emissions in 1994 (the year
of our tax simulation). It is remarkable the importance of energy-related
emissions, which obviously make CO2 emissions quite dependent on the
economic cycle and on the structural efficiency of the energy system. Actually,
Spanish energy-related CO2 emissions saw a 25 per cent increase between 1984
and 1994.
If the current need for a credible Spanish climate change policy is
indisputable, there are also arguments that favour the use of carbon taxation in
                                                                                                                                   
1Spain signed and ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). As an
Annex I party of the Convention, Spain should return to 1990 levels of anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions by 2000 (Rio target). Moreover, as an Annex B party of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol developing the
Convention, Spanish greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 should be below 1990 levels. However, in both cases,
Spain was granted a surprising exemption through the EU’s overall targets which allowed Spanish emissions to
grow substantially. This was justified on the grounds of the large energy requirements considered to be needed
to overcome the relative ‘underdevelopment’ of the Spanish economy (see Labandeira (1997)).
2It is expected that Spanish greenhouse gas emissions will be allowed to increase by about 15 per cent between
1990 and 2010 (see Mas-García (1998)).Fiscal Studies
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this context. On the one hand, environmental taxes constitute an extremely
efficient decentralised (market) mechanism for implementing environmental
policies. On the other hand, the practical feasibility of carbon taxes and their
substantial revenues have defined a so-called green tax reform model in which
distortionary conventional taxes are partly substituted by new environmental
taxes (see Álvarez, Gago and Labandeira (1998)).
2. Carbon Tax Design and Implementation
As indicated above, carbon taxes not only constitute key tools for climate change
policies but are also powerful fiscal instruments. In this section, we build a
practicable carbon tax from various theoretical results.
3
First, we must refer to the jurisdictional allocation of the carbon tax. Optimal
carbon taxes should be allocated to a world-wide authority because they are a
response to a global environmental problem. However, the implausibility of that
institutional arrangement recommends the assignment of the hypothetical tax on
Spanish CO2 emissions to the Spanish central government.
Concerning tax-rate setting, there are a number of options. The Pigouvian
alternative would introduce a rate equal to the marginal damage of CO2
emissions at the optimum.
4 As an alternative, the cost-effective carbon tax rate
would be the shadow price from cost minimisation with an exogenous CO2
concentration standard (see Baumol and Oates (1988)). The latter, known as the
carbon budget approach, requires less information than the former as damage
from greenhouse gases does not need to be modelled and valued. Yet in both
                                                                                                                                   
3For a comprehensive discussion of real-world environmental taxes, see Smith (1992).
4Therefore the carbon tax rate would be the shadow price in an intertemporal cost–benefit model. See Smith
(1992) for a fuller explanation.
TABLE 1
Spanish CO2 Emissions, 1994







Industrial processes 16,370 6.19
Waste 2,657 1.00
Total 264,641 100
Source: Spanish Ministry of the Environment.Effects of Carbon Tax on Spanish Households
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cases complete international co-ordination of carbon taxation would be
necessary, as the tax rates are calculated to keep future emissions on an optimal
global path towards the maximum net benefits or the exogenous environmental
standard.
Previous approaches based on shadow price approximations contrast with the
simpler ‘actual damage cost’ approach, where the carbon tax rate is set to equal
the marginal damage from CO2 discharges at the existing level of world
emissions. As climate change is a dynamic process, the method must take into
account the trajectory of future CO2 emissions for damage calculation. If future
emissions change due to policy action, the method becomes more complex as a
new trajectory has to be assessed.
Therefore this approach is especially appealing when the carbon tax causes a
small-scale CO2 reduction unable to alter the original (and known) trajectory.
Indeed, the actual damage approach is ideal for determining a unilateral Spanish
carbon tax rate because Spain is a small economy that causes slightly less than 1
per cent of the world’s CO2 emissions.
We have decided to use the CO2 actual damage estimate obtained by
Fankhauser (1994) to determine our hypothetical carbon tax rate. Fankhauser
employed a stochastic greenhouse damage model in which all parameters were
defined as random because of the scientific controversies on climate change
processes. Fankhauser’s central damage estimate for the period 1991–2000 (in
1990 US dollars) is 20.3 per tonne of carbon, with a wide 90 per cent confidence
interval: 6.2 as lower bound and 45.2 as upper bound.
Focusing on the central damage estimate, it is significantly higher than those
reported by the shadow price literature, which is not only explained by the
methodological differences but also by Fankhauser’s use of expected values
instead of the usual best guesses, as the distribution of global warming damage is
skewed to the right (see Labandeira and Labeaga (1998a)). Moreover, if we
compare the central damage estimate to the original ‘ecotax’ proposal by the
European Commission for 1994 without taking the energy segment into account
(see Pearson and Smith (1991)), the figures are surprisingly close. The central
damage estimate is, however, lower than some implemented carbon tax rates,
such as the Swedish tax on industries (60 per cent higher) and on households
(550 per cent higher) — Lövgren (1994).
Besides, our hypothetical carbon tax rate is much lower than those obtained
with a carbon budget approach for the UK and Australia (Symons, Proops and
Gay, 1994; Cornwell and Creedy, 1996). Although the preceding studies also
combined input–output analysis and simulation with micro-data, the carbon tax
rates were endogenously determined to meet the Toronto target: a 20 per cent
reduction in CO2 emissions between 1988 and 2005. Such a stringent and
immediate CO2 target, which should be exclusively fulfilled through finalFiscal Studies
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demand responses (see Section III), led to extremely high carbon taxes in those
exercises.
5
Regarding the carbon tax base, it is quite easy to choose a non-contentious
and simple one. Given the major significance of CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel
combustion (see Table 1), it seems reasonable to tax energy-related emissions
alone. Whereas this clearly leads to higher administrative feasibility, the
presence of a large number of polluters renders difficult the direct taxation of
emissions. However, the existence of good linkage between fossil-fuel
consumption and CO2 emissions sustains the use of product taxation to overcome
the previous problem. The product tax rates can be directly calculated by
combining the adopted carbon tax rate and the available carbon contents of fossil
fuels.
Given the expected stability of carbon tax revenues to be controlled by the
Spanish tax administration, they could be employed either for general fiscal
purposes or to compensate some negative distributional effects brought about by
the externality correction.
III. CALCULATING THE PRICE CHANGES CAUSED BY CARBON
TAXATION THROUGH INPUT–OUTPUT METHODOLOGY
In this paper, we deal exclusively with the impacts of carbon taxation on
consumer prices. To do so, we employ input–output methodology to assess the
price effects of carbon taxes, which is justified on multiple grounds. On the one
hand, the generalised dependence of contemporary societies upon CO2 emissions
means that it is not possible to approximate the influences of carbon taxes by
focusing on a single sector. On the other hand, the comparative significance of
‘indirect’ emissions from final consumption also requires the use of a
comprehensive approach.
6
The use of input–output methods to appraise the incidence of energy taxes is
widely accepted, as they are able to disentangle the complex industrial
relationships within any developed economy. In particular, input–output analysis
has been used recently to estimate the price effects of carbon taxation in
Australia (Cornwell and Creedy, 1996), Britain and Germany (Proops, Faber and
Wagenhals, 1993). The preceding studies employed an input–output demand
model to calculate the CO2 intensities for each industrial branch — i.e. the
carbon contents of their products — which allows for a straightforward
                                                                                                                                   
5The (minimum) hypothetical British carbon tax rate needed to achieve the Toronto target would amount to
1990 US$411 per tonne of carbon. The simulated Australian carbon tax rate amounts to 1990 US$306 per
tonne of carbon.
6Consumers ‘directly’ cause CO2 emissions through fossil-fuel combustion. In addition, consumers are
responsible for some ‘indirect’ CO2 emissions that were generated to satisfy their demands.Effects of Carbon Tax on Spanish Households
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computation of the price changes after carbon taxation. Our exercise for the
Spanish economy basically follows the same procedure.
Input–output analyses are therefore well suited to assessing the effects of a
carbon tax levied on fossil fuels (coal, lignite, natural and manufactured gas and
liquid fuels in this exercise) on the relative prices of outputs. Yet a key
assumption of this process is the full shifting of carbon taxation to consumption,
a very strong and unlikely premiss that does not allow for general equilibrium
effects such as changes in factor prices and pre-tax prices of goods. Moreover, it
is assumed that no substitution takes place in production following the
introduction of the carbon tax, which is obviously related to the incidence
presumption. Therefore the results should only be taken as a short-term
approximation to the impacts of taxes on inputs.
The underlying input–output demand model is rather simple, depicting the
relationship between CO2 emissions and fossil-fuel use by industries and final
consumers. Still, we found some difficulties with its practical implementation,
given the absence of reliable and updated data on disaggregated Spanish energy
consumption. Therefore we had to produce our own set of energy data from
various and fragmentary sources, which fortunately seems largely consistent
with reality.
7
Our sole concern with the actual emissions from Spanish soil determined the
use of domestic magnitudes to calculate the CO2 intensities and price effects
(except in the case of imported fossil fuels, as their use in Spain leads to Spanish
CO2 emissions). This means that we considered a domestic carbon tax with
effects on the price of domestically produced goods but not of imports.
8 This
procedure is also linked to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) legal
objections to measures designed to protect internal and external markets against
non-taxed foreign products.
As required for the micro-simulation, the price rises refer to 1994, albeit they
were calculated from the 1992 CO2 intensities. This is explained by the
unavailability of disaggregated energy and conventional input–output data for
the Spanish economy after 1992. In any case, given the short-term structural
stability, we expect few variations between the 1992 and 1994 CO2 intensities. A
full description of this input–output application to Spain can be found in
Labandeira and Labeaga (1998a).
Table 2 reports the price increases for the eight-commodity grouping of the
demand system used by the micro-simulation. They stem from the range of
carbon tax rates obtained by Fankhauser (1994) for the period 1991–2000, after
reconciling the 57-sector input–output classification with the eight new groups
                                                                                                                                   
7Indeed, the total and disaggregated emission estimates from our input–output model are very similar to the
figures provided by the official Spanish environmental inventories (see Labandeira and Labeaga (1998a)).
8To differentiate between domestic goods and imports, we used a Leontief inverse, accounting only for
domestic intermediate demands and imported fossil fuels.Fiscal Studies
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through the PROCOME-CNAE translation (see INE (1993)). For the cases
where several 57-sector classifications related to one of the new commodity
groups, the new price increase was taken as the weighted average of the related
sector price increases, with the weights being the proportional contribution to the
new group’s final demand.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE HYPOTHETICAL CARBON TAX FROM
MICRO-DATA
This section describes the micro-simulation procedure we employed to assess the
effects of the proposed environmental tax. The main results of this micro-
simulation are also presented here, with an explicit calculation of the impact of
carbon taxation on aggregate government receipts, CO2 emissions, monetarised
environmental benefits and the distribution of burdens across households.
The micro-simulation procedure uses a demand system that is estimated from
the Continuous Spanish Family Expenditure Survey (ECPF) for 1985–94 and a
sample of 29,648 households. In order to obtain a realistic picture of the
substitution, own-price and income effects, we opted for the quadratic extension
(QAIDS) to the Almost Ideal Demand System of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)
as proposed by Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997). Full details on this demand
system estimation can be obtained from Labandeira and Labeaga (1998b).
We consider an indirect tax reform as the tax-induced change in the relative
prices of the commodities that compose the demand system, focusing on the
short-run effects from the price changes. As the system expenditure groups are
composed of goods bearing different tax rates, we calculate the pre- and post-
reform price indices as the sum of the prices of all individual goods weighted by
their contribution to the composite category. The pre-reform price for good i is
TABLE 2
Price Changes from Carbon Taxes, Spain, 1994
Per cent
Category Central estimate Lower bound Upper bound
Food and non-alcoholic drinks 0.3490 0.1065 0.7758
Alcohol 0.3033 0.0925 0.6742
Clothing and footwear 0.2275 0.0694 0.5057
Electricity 3.8456 1.1734 8.5483
Natural and manufactured gas 3.2066 0.9784 7.1279
Fuel for private transport 2.7991 0.8541 6.2221
Public transport 1.1990 0.3658 2.6650
Other non-durables 0.1550 0.0473 0.3445Effects of Carbon Tax on Spanish Households
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where 
0
i t ,  i q  and 
0
i e  respectively denote the initial value added tax (VAT), the
net-of-tax producer price and the excise rates. Although the price changes also
apply to goods bearing excise duties, the reform does not affect these duties.
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where 
1
i t  is the post-reform VAT.
The first step for revenue simulation consists of calculating the new predicted
budget shares by using the parameters obtained in the estimation and the new
after-tax prices. When doing this, we must take into account that the model does
not predict shares in a perfect manner. Since we are interested in the price and
real expenditure effects, it is desirable to separate those components from the
overall expenditure on each commodity. We add the share prediction error to the
predicted shares as in Baker, McKay and Symons (1990): that is, the part of each
share not explained by prices and real expenditure or, equivalently, the
component of the share explained by household characteristics, other non-price
and non-real expenditure variables and the residual, which may contain effects of
fixed unobserved characteristics specific to households.
Once the new shares have been computed, we can calculate the tax changes
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where  h g  is the sample weight of each household and 
1
hi E  is the estimated post-
reform level of expenditure on good i by household h.
We also provide some measures of the welfare effects from the simulated tax
reforms. Despite its various conceptual drawbacks (see Banks, Blundell and
Lewbel (1996)), the change in household welfare is quantified through the
equivalent gain, a money-metric impact of price changes. An equivalent gain
(loss) is actually the amount of money that needs to be subtracted from (given to)
the household in order to attain the pre-reform level of utility at final prices. We
follow the method of King (1983) in computing this measure, although adapting
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where  0 u  is pre-reform utility, 
0 p  pre-reform prices, 
1 p  post-reform prices,
0
0 (, ) cu p  the observed pre-reform expenditure and 
1
0 (,) cu p  the equivalent
income — the expenditure level at pre-reform prices that is equivalent in utility
terms to household expenditure at final prices.
1. Overall Impacts: The Dividends from Carbon Taxation
For welfare and revenue simulation, we have used the 3,000 households that
correspond to the second quarter of 1994 in the sample, the latest available from
the ECPF. Tables 3 and 4 describe the overall impacts of the simulated reform,
which is not revenue-neutral.
9 The first table presents government receipts, as
calculated from equation 3, with a prediction of a 6.74 per cent increase in VAT
revenues relative to the pre-reform situation. The groups contributing most to
such a revenue expansion are those with the highest price rises: electricity, gas,
fuel for private transport and public transport. This would lead to a sizeable
revenue boost, with some extra 160,000 million pesetas (approximately 1,000
million euros). Those revenues represent 1.5 per cent of total Spanish receipts in
1994 and could be used in a double dividend fashion, i.e. to reduce other
distortionary tax burdens.
TABLE 3











Food and non-alcoholic drinks 342,753.4 362,006.5 5.62
Alcohol 72,438.4 75,422.1 4.12
Clothing and footwear 376,000.5 380,338.1 1.15
Electricity 81,326.4 101,596.7 24.9
Natural and manufactured gas 8,180.6 11,162.2 36.4
Fuel for private transport 464,379.5 553,010.7 19.1
Public transport 39,949.0 48,630.7 21.7
Other non-durables 943,071.6 952,770.3 1.03
Total 2,327,919.5 2,484,937.4 6.74
                                                                                                                                   
9There are strong reasons to model the reforms as revenue-neutral, since the changes in receipts will normally
be fed back to consumers through subsidies and/or changes in the supply of public goods. However, the short-
term nature of the exercise explains the use of such ‘absolute’ measures of distributional tax incidence.Effects of Carbon Tax on Spanish Households
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TABLE 4











Food and non-alcoholic drinks –0.78 –206,000 172,792
Alcohol 1.75 3,520 –2,953
Clothing and footwear –0.58 –45,750 38,376
Electricity –4.25 –1,215,399 1,019,476
Natural and manufactured gas 8.92 213,130 –178,774
Fuel for private transport –2.37 –2,873,969 2,410,686
Public transport –15.7 –2,671,602 2,240,939
Other non-durables –0.16 –21,378 17,932
Total n.a –6,817,448 5,718,474
aPercentage change in total demand following the introduction of the carbon tax.
bImputed reduction in CO2 emissions from demand changes.
cEnvironmental benefits from CO2 abatement following the introduction of the carbon tax.
Table 4 shows the expected relative demand changes by commodity group
after carbon taxation, already implicit in Table 3. Especially noticeable is the
substantial increase in the demand for natural and manufactured gas, which is
due to the strong substitution of electricity by natural gas, as indicated by the
cross-price elasticities (see Labandeira and Labeaga (1998b)).
With the preceding information and the CO2 intensities, we are able to
calculate the tax-induced modification in CO2 emissions. The appraisal of
environmental benefits is straightforward: we apply the carbon tax rate to
abatement. Note the relatively low CO2 abatement achieved by the carbon tax
(6,817 kt, only 3 per cent of energy-related emissions), with environmental
benefits merely representing 3.5 per cent of total carbon tax receipts. This
obviously reflects the huge dependence of contemporary economies on fossil-
fuel consumption and is not surprising as the carbon tax affects all sectors in the
economy.
2. Some Distributional Effects
In looking at distributional effects, we begin by presenting in Table 5 the
percentage increase in tax payments (relative to the pre-reform situation) by
decile of expenditure and using subsamples corresponding to some socio-
economic variables. It is noticeable that there are not significant differences in
the relative tax-payment increase by demographic breakdown. In this sense, we
sustain the conclusions of other empirical exercises on this issue, corroborating




Quarterly Change in Tax Payments by Demographic Variable and by Decile
Percentage change
All households 6.48
Age < 65 6.48
Age ≥ 65 6.51
No children 6.54
1 child 6.64
















as a percentage of pre-
reform total expenditure
All households 15,924.7 2.91
Age < 65 16,065.8 2.83
Age ≥ 65 15,125.5 3.35
No children 13,685.4 2.97
1 child 15,791.3 2.92
≥ 2 children 17,405.5 2.86
Decile 1 5,168.8 2.70
Decile 2 7,613.8 2.76
Decile 3 9,423.7 2.81
Decile 4 11,045.7 2.85
Decile 5 12,428.3 2.81
Decile 6 14,657.1 2.93
Decile 7 17,028.6 3.00
Decile 8 19,429.3 2.95
Decile 9 24,637.6 3.11
Decile 10 37,834.3 3.14Effects of Carbon Tax on Spanish Households
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At this stage, we must note that all the distributional measures of our exercise
refer not to household income but to household expenditure. This is because
short-run income may be an unreliable indicator of well-being, as is clear from
the life-cycle and permanent-income theories of consumption. Indeed, household
income may easily vary from year to year, whereas consumption is thought to be
set on the basis of long-run income (Poterba, 1989).
Table 6 reports the welfare effects of the carbon tax for the same groups as in
Table 5. The first column contains our money-metric measure of utility change,
while the second column represents the relative size of the equivalent loss (with
respect to pre-reform total expenditure). All figures are equivalent losses because
every reform leads to price increases in all the expenditure groups of the demand
system.
TABLE 7
Effects of Alternative Damage Estimates
Total revenues after reform











Food and non-alcoholic drinks 347,409.1 1.36 387,730.0 13.1
Alcohol 73,946.3 2.08 79,143.3 9.26
Clothing and footwear 377,432.1 0.38 385,490.8 2.52
Electricity 87,499.2 7.59 126,190.0 55.2
Natural and manufactured gas 9,030.1 10.4 15,399.1 88.2
Fuel for private transport 491,335.4 5.80 662,255.9 42.6
Public transport 42,618.9 6.68 59,425.2 48.8
Other non-durables 948,769.6 0.60 959,801.5 1.77
Total 2,377,489.1 2.13 2,675,435.9 14.9
Distributional effects
Percentage change in quarterly tax payments
Lower damage estimate Upper damage estimate
All households 1.98 14.47
Age < 65 1.97 14.48
Age ≥ 65 2.08 14.38
No children 2.07 14.48
≥ 2 children 1.89 14.31
Decile 1 1.63 12.51
Decile 10 2.18 14.65Fiscal Studies
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There are several issues that emerge from the figures in Table 6. First, the
equivalent losses are comparatively substantial in all groups, which means that
price increases are significant and affect Spanish households in a non-negligible
way. Second, the variation of equivalent losses across total expenditure deciles is
inconclusive on the regressivity or progressivity of the reform, although the
reform has a greater effect on households with older heads.
10
3. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we present the results of two new tax reforms, using the lower-
and upper-bound damage estimates of Fankhauser (1994) as tax rates and their
incidence on prices (see Table 2). This information is also useful as a sort of
sensitivity analysis of the effects of the hypothetical carbon tax rates and it
allows for an easier comparison with other implemented or proposed carbon tax
rates.
Table 7 shows the revenue and distributional effects of the alternative carbon
tax rates and can be easily compared with the results presented in Tables 3 and 5
for the central tax reform. In general, we can observe that the main trends
pointed out across the paper are still valid: lower or higher carbon taxes do not
modify the pattern of distributional incidence, and tax receipts are mainly
determined by the tax rate, i.e. the demand for carbon emissions seems to be
rather rigid.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This article has explored the economic effects of a hypothetical tax levied on
Spanish energy-related CO2 emissions. The paper responds to the large rise in
Spanish CO2 emissions in recent years and, therefore, to the mounting need to
control Spanish greenhouse gas emissions in an efficient manner. Our proposed
tax design includes jurisdictional allocation to the Spanish central government,
the use of linked product (carbon) taxation and the adoption of an ‘actual
damage’ tax rate.
The empirical analysis has proceeded in stages. First, we employed an input–
output demand model to calculate the CO2 intensities for each industrial branch,
which allowed for a direct computation of the price changes following the
introduction of carbon taxation. We then estimated a demand system for the
Spanish economy, as this was necessary for micro-simulation. Finally, we
simulated the environmental and economic effects of the new tax-induced prices.
Given the size and stability of carbon tax revenues, we were particularly
interested in appraising the distributional impacts of the hypothetical carbon tax
                                                                                                                                   
10In Labandeira and Labeaga (1998a), we simulate a revenue-neutral tax reform by returning the carbon tax
receipts as a constant lump-sum subsidy to households. In this particular case, the tax reform shows a largely
progressive profile.Effects of Carbon Tax on Spanish Households
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as its environmental effects were likely to be modest in the short run. In this
sense, the use of ad hoc welfare measures did not sustain the presumed
regressivity of carbon taxation in Spain.
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